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Following ideas in Hume, monetary shocks are embedded in the Lagos-Wright model
in a new way: there are only nominal shocks that are accomplished by way of individual
transfers and there is sufficient noise in individual transfers so that realizations of those
transfers do not permit the agents to deduce much about the aggregate realization. The
last condition is achieved by assuming that the distribution of aggregate shocks is almost
degenerate. For such rare shocks, aggregate output increases with the growth rate of the
stock of money—our definition of the Phillips curve. This almost-degeneracy assumption
is far from being necessary; under some mild conditions, the Phillips curve result holds for
a large class of distributions.
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1 Introduction
In his Nobel lecture [see “Monetary Neutrality” (Lucas (1996)], Lucas begins by describing
Hume’s (1970) views about the effects of changes in the money supply. Lucas emphasizes that
Hume’s views were dependent on how changes in the quantity of money come about. In order to
get neutrality, Hume set out very special conceptual experiments which, when correct, amount to
changes in monetary units. For some other kinds of changes, Hume says that there is a short-run
Phillips curve:
Accordingly we find that, in every kingdom into which money begins to flow in
greater abundance than formerly, everything takes a new face: labour and industry
gain life, the merchant becomes more enterprising...
To account, then, for this phenomenon, we must consider, that though the high
price of commodities be a necessary consequence of the encrease of gold and silver,
yet it follows not immediately upon that encrease, but some time is required before
the money circulates through the whole state, and makes its effect be felt on all ranks
of people. At first, no alteration is perceived; by degrees the price rises, first of one
commodity, then of another, till the whole at last reaches a just proportion with the
new quantity of specie in the kingdom. In my opinion, it is only in this interval or
intermediate situation, between the acquisition and rise of prices, that the encreasing
quantity of gold and silver is favorable to industry. When any quantity of money is
imported into a nation, it is not at first dispersed into many hands but is confined to
the coffers of a few persons, who immediately seek to employ it to advantage. [Hume
(1970), page 37.]
Hume asserts that there is a positive association between the changes in the stock of money and
real economic activity, which is our definition of the Phillips curve.2 He also offers what may
2To be precise, we use the term Phillips-curve to mean that total output is strictly increasing in the growth
rate of the stock of money. As is true of many models of the relationship between money and economic activity,
there is no unemployment in our model.
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at some time have been regarded as an explanation of it. A modern economist would not treat
his discussion as an explanation, but might look to it for hints about modeling ingredients that
when rigorously analyzed could conceivably constitute an explanation.
The passage from which the above excerpt comes contains at least two hints about modeling
ingredients. First, changes in the quantity of money come about in a way that gives rise to
changes in relative money holdings among people. In particular, the changes for individuals
are not uniformly proportional to initial holdings as is required for neutrality. Second, trade
seems to be occurring within small groups, rather than in a centralized market. That suggests
the use of some sort of search/matching model. Given those ingredients, the passage hints at
two conjectures that might be studied. One is that a change in relative money holdings has
Phillips-curve type effects that dissipate over time through the effects of subsequent trades on
those relative holdings. The other is that the change occurs in a way that is not seen by everyone
when it occurs and that the Phillips-curve type effects dissipate when people learn about it.
Although these are not mutually exclusive conjectures, we pursue only the second here.
In order to study it, we embed monetary shocks in the Lagos and Wright (2005) (LW) model
and assume that the aggregate monetary shocks (i) are observed with a lag and (ii) are accom-
plished by way of individual transfers in such a way that those transfers are imperfect signals
about the aggregate shock. The information imperfection is modeled in the usual way: there is
a fixed support for individual transfers and the aggregate shock determines the distribution over
that fixed support. Our main contribution is to show that when these transfers are relatively
uninformative about the aggregate shock, there is a Phillips curve. For general parameter values,
we show this when the distribution of the aggregate shock is close to a degenerate distribution—
that is, when shocks are rare. But this near-degeneracy is far from being necessary: under some
mild conditions, we obtain the Phillips curve for a large class of distributions of the aggregate
shock. We also provide a counterexample that illustrates how things could go wrong.
We are not the first to study the Phillips curve in a model of small-group trade. Wallace
(1997) and Katzman et. al. (2003) do so in a model in which money holdings are limited to
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be in the set {0, 1}. However, Phillips curve results in both papers depend on the assumption
that less than half the population has money, an assumption that is troublesome because it
has no analogue when money is divisible. Nor are we the first to use some version of LW to
study the Phillips curve. Faig and Li (2009) embed a version of the signal-extraction problem in
Lucas (1972) into that model. That signal-extraction problem involves a delicate confounding of
real and nominal shocks, and the sign of the slope of the Phillips curve depends on preferences.
In contrast, our Phillips curve relies on the assumption that individual transfers are relatively
uninformative about the aggregate shock. Moreover, our specification is closer to Hume, is
conceptually simpler, and is strategic.3 In it, people meet in pairs and do not see the transfers
received or the trades in other meetings. Therefore, they can only use what they experience in
their meeting to draw inferences about the aggregate shock.
2 The model
The background model is that in LW. Time is discrete and there are two stages at each date.
In the first stage, the decentralized market (the DM), production and consumption occur in
pairwise meetings that occur at random in the following way. Just prior to such meetings, each
person looks forward to being a consumer (buyer) who meets a random producer (seller) with
probability σ, looks forward to being a producer who meets a random consumer with probability
σ, and looks forward to a no-coincidence meeting with probability 1 − 2σ, where σ ≤ 1/2. In
the DM, u(y) is the utility of consuming and c(y) is the disutility of producing, where u and c
are twice differentiable, u(0) = c(0) = 0, u is strictly concave, c is convex, and u′(0) − c′(0) is
infinite. We also assume that y∗ = argmaxy[u(y) − c(y)] exists. In the second stage all agents
can consume and produce and meet in the centralized market (the CM), where the utility of
consuming is z and where negative z is production. At each stage, production is perishable and
the discount factor between dates is β ∈ (0, 1).
3Lucas (1972) and Faig and Li (2009) use rational-expectations competitive-equilibrium as a solution concept
and have agents learn from the prices they see. Such learning has not been given a strategic foundation.
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In our version, the gross growth rate of the money stock follows an iid process with finite
support S, where S = {s1, s2, ..., sN} with 1 ≤ sn < sn+1. We let π denote the distribution over
S. The changes in the stock of money are accomplished by random proportional transfers to
individuals. We let T = {τ1, τ2, ..., τI} be the set of possible gross proportional transfers to a
person, where 1 ≤ τi < τi+1. We let µs(τ) be the probability that an agent receives the transfer
τ ∈ T conditional on the aggregate state s ∈ S. (As this suggests, conditional on s, agents
receive independently drawn transfers.) We assume that µs satisfies the following conditions.
First, the individual transfers aggregate to s. That is,
I∑
i=1
µs(τi)τi = s (1)
for each s ∈ S. Second, except for one of the neutrality results, we assume that µs has full
support for all s ∈ S and that it satisfies the following strict version of first-order stochastic







The weak inequality of version of (2) is first-order stochastic dominance.4
There are two versions of the model; one with an information lag and one without such a lag.
The sequence of actions when there is an information lag is as follows. After people leave the
CM, the growth rate of the stock of money, s ∈ S, is realized, but not observed. Then agents
meet at random in pairs. Then each agent receives a proportional money transfer, a draw from
µs(τ). Within a meeting, both the pre-transfer and post-transfer money holdings are common
knowledge. In a meeting where the transfers received are τi and τj, the common posterior about





4Condition (1) and the full support assumption about µs imply that the range of S is a strict subset of the
range of T .
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If the meeting is between a buyer and seller, then the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer.
After meetings, agents learn s and enter the next CM.5 If an agent leaves the pairwise trade
stage, the DM, with m amount of money, then the agent enters the next CM with m/s amount
of money. (This is the standard way of normalizing inflation so that the per capita quantity of
money and the price of money can be constant.) This also allows us to normalize average money
holding to be unity. Then, in price-taking trade, the good trades for money at the next CM.6
The sequence of actions when there is no information-lag is identical except that the growth
rate of the stock of money, s, is observed when it is realized. In that case, pij(s) in (3) is replaced
by a distribution that is degenerate on the realized s.7
Several comments are in order about this specification. First, we model the transfers as
proportional to money holdings in order to isolate the effect of heterogeneous transfers (see
Corollary 2 below). Our Phillips curve result would also hold if the transfers were lump-sum.
However, then, as is well-known, the transfers would have real effects even without heterogeneity.
Second, the only role of assuming that the transfers are realized within meetings as opposed to
before meetings is to rationalize the assumption that each person in a meeting knows the transfer
received by their trading partner. Third, the assumption that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-
it offer in meetings is not crucial. We suspect that the results also hold for many of the bargaining
rules described in Gu and Wright (2016).
5In a somewhat different context, Araujo and Shevchenko (2006) study the complications that arise when the
information lag is longer.
6As in Hu et.al. (2009), this price-taking trade can easily be modeled as a game.
7As may be evident, the information-lag version and the no information-lag version are special cases of a more
general specification. The buyer’s transfer and the seller’s transfer play very different roles in the model. Both
symmetrically affect the posterior over the aggregate realization in the information-lag version. In addition, the
buyer’s transfer affects spending directly in both versions. Therefore, the information-lag version is equivalent
to a setting in which only the buyer realizes a transfer, but the pair in a meeting see the buyer’s transfer and
also see the buyer’s transfer in one other randomly chosen meeting. But, then, what if the pair in a meeting see




We start with existence of stationary monetary equilibrium. The objects in a stationary monetary
equilibrium are output in buyer-seller meetings—denoted yij, where τi is the transfer received by
the buyer and τj is that received by the seller—and the price of money in the CM—denoted v.
Proposition 1. In each version of the model, either with or without an information-lag, there
exists a unique valued-money stationary equilibrium. In that equilibrium yij < y∗ for at least
some (i, j). Moreover, yij and v are continuous in π.
The proof, which follows, is familiar from other expositions of LW. Standard arguments show
that the value function entering the CM is affine, and that the rate-of-return of money from one
CM to next CM is equal to one. Given that result, the equilibrium condition reduces to the
solution to an optimal saving decision in the CM, a decision which is common to everyone.
Proof. Assume that there is an information-lag. (As we remark at the end, the no-information-
lag version is a special case.) We refer to the current centralized market as the CM. As is
well-known, the value of entering the next CM with m′ amount of money is v′m′+A, where v′ is
the price of money and A is a constant. In a stationary equilibrium, v′ = v, the price of money
in the current CM.
A person who enters the DM with m amount of money is a buyer with probability σ, a
seller with probability σ, or is in a no-coincidence meeting with probability 1 − 2σ. Given the
assumed continuation value in the next CM, we start by considering the buyer’s problem, the
only significant one in the DM,
Consider a buyer who enters the DM with m amount of money and is in meeting (i, j), one in
which the buyer receives transfer τi and the seller receives transfer τj. The problem of the buyer
is to choose output, yij, and the amount of money to offer, dij, to maximize u(yij) + v′(mτi −
dij)Eij(1/s) subject to mτi − dij ≥ 0 and




n=1 pij(sn)/sn, where pij(sn) is given by (3) and where Eij(1/s) = Eji(1/s).
Because the value function in the next CM is affine, the seller’s money holding appears in (4) only
by way of Eij(1/s). At a solution to this problem, (4) holds at equality. (If not, then increase yij.)
Substituting (4) at equality into the objective, the objective becomes u(yij)− c(yij). Therefore,
the solution has two branches depending on whether the constraint mτi−dij ≥ 0 is binding. The
non-binding case has yij = y∗ and dij given by (4) at equality. The binding case has dij = mτi
and yij given by (4) at equality. That is,
yij =

y∗ if c(y∗) ≤ v′mτiEij(1/s)





c(y∗)/v′Eij(1/s) if c(y∗) ≤ v′mτiEij(1/s)
mτi if c(y∗) > v′mτiEij(1/s)
. (6)
Therefore, the buyer’s payoff is u(yij) + (mτi − dij)v′Eij(1/s) + A.
Now suppose the person with m is not a buyer but realizes transfer τi when the trading
partner realizes transfer τj. This person’s payoff is the same whether the person is a seller or is
in a no-coincidence meeting because sellers receive no gains from trade—(4) at equality with the
roles of i and j reversed. Thus, the person’s payoff as a seller or in a no-coincidence meeting is
v′mτiEij(1/s) + A.
Therefore, ignoring constant terms, both money brought into the CM and the constant A,






γij {σ [u(yij)− v′dijEij(1/s)] + v′mτiEij(1/s)} , (7)
where γij =
∑
n π(sn)µsn(τi)µsn(τj), which by the law of iterated expectations, is the uncondi-
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tional probability that the person receives transfer τi and is in a meeting with a person who
receives τj. Now, because
∑






γij [u(yij)− v′dijEij(1/s)] . (8)
Letting x = mv, real saving, and imposing v = v′, an equivalent choice problem is
max
x≥0




where, by (5) and (6),
ỹij(x) =

y∗ if c(y∗) ≤ xτiEij(1/s)





c(y∗)/Eij(1/s) if c(y∗) ≤ xτiEij(1/s)
xτi if c(y∗) > xτiEij(1/s)
. (11)
The rest of the proof appears in the appendix. There, it is shown that G is differentiable






It follows that the choice of x can be limited to the compact domain [0, x̄], that G has a maximum,
and that any maximum occurs in the interval (0, x̄). Then it is shown that G′(x) is strictly
decreasing on (0, x̄), which implies that G is strictly concave on (0, x̄). That implies that the
maximum, denoted x̂, is unique. And, because x̄ is continuous in π, the Theorem of the Maximum
implies that x̂ is continuous in π. Because yij is continuous in x, it also is continuous in π. Because
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we normalize the per capita quantity of money to be unity, v = x̂ follows from equating real
saving to the real value of money. In order to see that yij < y∗ for some (i, j), we consider two
cases. If mini,j[τiEij(1/s)] = τkEkl(1/s) for all (k, l), then x̂ < x̄ implies ykl < y∗ for all (k, l).
Otherwise, ykl < y∗ for all (k, l) such that mini,j[τiEij(1/s)] < τkEkl(1/s). The proof for the
no-information-lag version is identical except that Eij(1/s) is replaced by 1/s.
Two neutrality results follow from the above exposition.
Corollary 1. If economies 1 and 2 are identical except that S2 = αS1 and T 2 = αT 1 for some
α > 1, then both economies have the same real equilibria.
Proof. It is immediate that E2ij(1/s) = (1/α)E1ij(1/s). From that it follows that α does not
appear in (9)-(12).
It follows that we can without loss of generality impose τ1 = 1, as we do in some examples
below.
Corollary 2. If there is no heterogeneity in realized individual transfers—meaning that for
each s, µs(τ) = 1 for some τ—then the equilibrium is the same as that of an economy with a
degenerate π (no aggregate uncertainty).
Proof. Let s be the realized aggregate shock. By the hypothesis, there exists τ(s) such that
µs[τ(s)] = 1. It follows that Eij(1/s) = 1/s and from (1) that τ(s) = s. Therefore, using (10),
and (11), u[ỹij(x)]− vd̃ij(x)Eij(1/s) does not depend on s and (9) reduces to the special case of
no randomness. 
4 The Phillips Curve under near degeneracy
Now we turn to our main result, the existence of a Phillips curve. Proposition 1 establishes
the existence of a unique stationary monetary equilibrium. For any π ∈ ∆(S), let y1ij(π) be the
corresponding equilibrium DM output for meeting type (τi, τj) with an information lag, and let
y0nij(π) be that without an information lag for meeting type (sn, τi, τj). Then, the respective
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aggregate DM outputs are


















where the second equality in (14) holds because output does not depend on the seller’s transfer
when there is no information lag. We focus on output in the DM, because output in the CM does
not depend on the realized aggregate shock. We say that there is a Phillips curve if Y 1(sn, π) is
strictly increasing in s.
According to (13), aggregate DM output is a weighted average of meeting specific outputs.
The meeting specific outputs, represented by the matrix [y1ij]i,j, do not depend on s. And
according to (2), the higher is s, the more weight is placed on those components of the matrix
with higher transfers. Intuitively, a Phillips curve would be obtained if meetings with higher
transfers are associated with higher outputs. However, that is delicate. Although high transfers
to buyers tend to increase spending in the meetings, high transfers (no matter whether to buyers
or to sellers) also suggest that the aggregate shock is high and, therefore, tend to offset the higher
spending effect. Our main Phillips-curve result, proposition 2, limits the informational role of
transfers by describing what happens in a neighborhood of a degenerate π. (In the next section
on robustness, we present some results that go beyond near-degeneracy to study the two effects.)
Proposition 2 establishes two results: one is about the dependence of Y 1(s, π) on s and the
other is about the dependence of Y 1(s, π)−Y 0(s, π) on s, both for a neighborhood of a degenerate
π. The first is the main Phillips curve result. The second says that the information lag plays a
role.
Proposition 2. Let π̃ ∈ ∆(S) and ñ be such that π̃(sñ) = 1. There is a neighborhood of
π̃ such that for all π in that neighborhood: (i) Y 1(s, π) is strictly increasing in s; and (ii)
Y 1(s, π)− Y 0(s, π) > 0 for all s > sñ and Y 1(s, π)− Y 0(s, π) < 0 for all s < sñ.
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Proof. (i) Because Y 1 is continuous in π, it suffices to show that Y 1(s, π̃) is strictly increasing
in s. For π = π̃, pij(sñ) = 1. This implies that Eij(1/s) = 1/sñ for all i, j. Therefore, y1ij(π̃) does
not depend on j and, as implied by Proposition 1, y11j(π̃) < y∗. Also, by (10), y1ij(π̃) is weakly
increasing in i and is not constant. Hence, by our strict stochastic dominance assumption (see
(2)), Y 1(s, π̃) is strictly increasing in s.
(ii) Because Y 1(s, π) and Y 0(s, π) are continuous in π, it is enough to establish the inequalities
for π = π̃. For π = π̃, the equilibrium real balance, x̂, does not depend on whether or not there is
an information-lag. Therefore, y1ij(π̃) = y0ñij(π̃). By (10) with Eij(1/s) = 1/s, y0nij(π̃) < y0n′ij(π̃)
for all n > n′and all i, j such that y0nij(π̃) < y∗ (which necessarily holds for i = 1). Therefore,
for n > ñ,












ñij(π̃)− y0nij(π̃)] > 0.
Similarly, for n < ñ,












ñij(π̃)− y0nij(π̃)] < 0,
which completes the proof. 
Notice that part (ii) of Proposition 2 says that the output effects of (rare) shocks are larger
when there is an information-lag. There is no claim about whether there is a Phillips curve when
there is no information-lag. Corollary 3 and example 1 demonstrate that little can be said in
general about the Phillips curve when there is no information lag.
Corollary 3. If (i) c(y) = y and (ii) β is small enough so that y0ni < y∗ for all n and i, then
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Y 0(sn, π) does not depend on sn.
Proof. Let xπ be the equilibrium real balance in the CM when there is no information-lag.
Under the assumptions,













/sn = σxπ, (17)
where the second equality follows from the second line of (10) and Eij(1/s) = 1/s, and where
the last equality follows from (1).
The following example shows that curvature in c(y) is enough to make Y 0(sn, π) non-monotone
in sn.
Example 1. Consider the model without an information-lag. Suppose that c(y) = y2, T =
{1, τ}, and that β is small enough so that yni(π) < y∗ for all n, i. Then, Y 0(sn, π) is non-
monotone in sn. (The proof is in the appendix.)
5 Robustness
There are special aspects of the model and special aspects of the process for aggregate shocks in
Proposition 2. Here we discuss whether the Phillips curve result will survive if we depart from
some of them.
5.1 More general iid shocks
As mentioned, a higher transfer has two distinct effects on the quantity produced in a given
meeting—the informational effect decreases output while the spending effect increases output.
Proposition 2, by assuming near-degeneracy, limits the first effect. That result is valid for any
distribution over T and any parameters of the model. Here, we focus on some special classes
of distributions, which allow us to analytically study the relative strength of these two forces.
The first class shows that the spending effect is stronger for a wide range of parameters, much
broader than near-degeneracy. The second and more special class shows that the informational
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effect can overcome the spending effect, at least for some realizations.
Proposition 3. Assume that T = {1, τ} and that π is a symmetric distribution with Eπ(s) =
(1+τ)/2. Also, assume that c(y) = y and that β is sufficiently small so that the buyer constraint
is always binding in equilibrium. Then, Y 1(s, π) is strictly increasing in s if the support of π is









The proof of Proposition 3 can be found in the Appendix. A two-point support for T is
convenient because condition (1) then determines µs(τ) and condition (2) is implied, but we
can obtain a similar result by introducing intermediate transfers in a symmetric fashion (see
Proposition 4 in the Appendix for details). For such T , feasibility requires that the support of
S be bounded by [α + (1 − α)τ, (1 − α) + ατ ] for some α ∈ (0, 1). The larger is τ , the more
stringent is the inequality in (18). However, even when τ converges to infinity, the right side of
(18) converges to 0.78, and, therefore, allows for a wide range of supports for s. For example,
Proposition 3 implies that, when τ ≤ 2, the Phillips curve result holds for any (discrete) uniform
distribution over [α + (1 − α)τ, (1 − α) + ατ ] with α ≤ 0.88. Moreover, by the continuity
established in Proposition 2, both the assumed symmetry and the condition on the expected
value of s need only hold approximately. Thus, Proposition 3 shows that near-degeneracy is far
from being necessary for the Phillips curve.
The following example, however, shows that some restriction on the support is necessary for
the Phillips curve result.
Example 2. Maintain all the assumptions in Proposition 3, except for (18). Instead, for each
N ∈ N, let SN = {1 + ε, 1 + 2ε, ..., 1 +Nε} with ε = (τ − 1)/(N + 1) and let





π(1 + nε) =
δ
N − 2
for all 2 ≤ n ≤ N − 1
for some small δ > 0. Then, there exist (large) N̄ and (small) δ̄ > 0 such that if N > N̄ and if
δ < δ̄, then Y 1(s, π) is not monotone in s. (The proof is in the appendix.)
In this example, π assigns high probability to the end-points of S. When both the buyer
and the seller receive τ , they are almost certain that the aggregate state is near τ , while if both
receive 1, then they are almost certain that the aggregate state is near 1. That is, the information
effect has full force in those meetings. If they were certain, then output would be the same in
those two meetings. If they are almost certain, then output when both receive τ is slightly larger
than when both receive 1. When one receives τ and the other receives 1, their interim belief is
almost identical to the prior belief, and average output over those two meetings is higher than
that for the other two kinds of meetings. Hence, aggregate output is increasing in the measure
of meetings with mixed transfers, a measure which is increasing in s for small s and decreasing
in s for large s.
Notice, also, that Example 2 is a counter-example only because our definition of the Phillips
curves calls for Y 1(s, π) to be monotone in s—even over parts of S that occur with very low
probability. A different approach would define the Phillips curve probabilistically—for example,
as a positive correlation between total output and s. Defined as a correlation, Example 2 would
not be a counter-example because the endpoints of S occur with arbitrarily high probability,
and output at the high endpoint is larger than at the low endpoint for N large. For example, if
u(y) =
√
y, β = 1/1.05, σ = 0.3, τ = 1.2, and π is as specified in Example 3 with N = 200 and
δ = 0.05, then Y 1(s, π) is non-monotone in s but the correlation between Y 1(s, π) and s is 0.99.
5.2 Markov aggregate shocks
With Markov shocks, the state entering a CM is the realized s from the previous period. Then
the guess is that there is a stationary equilibrium in which the price of money in the CM depends
on the realized aggregate shock from the previous period, denoted v(s). If so, then people in the
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CM in state s face a return distribution between that CM and the next CM, where the realized
return is v(s′)/v(s) and s′ is the realized aggregate shock in the current period. The stationary
equilibrium conditions implied by optimal saving choices give rise to N simultaneous equations
in v(s) for s ∈ S. In that case, existence requires a fixed point argument and the well-known
challenge is to choose a domain for v(s) for s ∈ S that excludes v(s) = 0 for all s ∈ S.
However, if we assume that the Markov process is nearly degenerate—has a transition matrix
for s which has a column all of whose elements are near unity—then our result in Proposition
2 applies by way of the implicit function theorem. In addition, our technique for getting a
Phillips curve should also apply for a Markov process that is nearly degenerate in a different
sense—namely, has a transition matrix that is close to the identity matrix.
5.3 Wealth effects
Barro (1989, pages 2-3) expresses the following concern about the robustness of the Phillips curve
in Lucas (1972). The transfer in Lucas goes entirely to potential consumers—as it does in Faig
and Li (2009). If both consumers and producers receive transfers, then richer producers may
want to produce less and that could offset the greater spending by consumers. We have transfers
going to both consumers and producers, but the structure of LW precludes wealth effects on
producers. In particular, the transfer that the seller receives matters for the trade in the DM
only because it is a signal about the aggregate shock.8
There are generalizations of LW that have wealth effects. The LW structure imposes a periodic
quasi-terminal condition: when the CM stage occurs, the economy restarts from that stage with
a degenerate distribution of money holdings and, hence, with no state variable. If there are
many DM stages before the CM stage in each period, then there are wealth effects before the
last DM stage because the continuation value of money will be strictly concave at least over
some of its domain. Indeed, with a large number of DM stages, the model at intermediate DM
stages resembles the divisible-money versions of the Shi (1995) and Trejos and Wright (1995)
8Katzman et. al. (2003) have transfers going to both consumers and producers, but, as noted above, their
results depend on the troublesome assumption that fewer than half the population has money.
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matching models studied by Zhu (2005) and Molico (2006), versions without aggregate shocks.
With aggregate shock realizations at each DM stage and even with the realized aggregate shock
at a stage announced just prior to the next stage, such a model combines both the role of an
information lag and the role of shocks on the evolution of the distribution of money holdings.
As might be expected, not much is known about such a version of the model. Some very
preliminary investigation of a version with two DM stages suggests that the implied seller wealth
effects do tend to weaken the kind of Phillips curve effects found for the one DM-stage model.
However, the implications seem to depend on the details of the model.
6 Concluding remarks
We set out to explore the validity of an idea that we find in Hume (1970); namely, that higher
increases in the quantity of money are accompanied by increases in total output if two conditions
are met. One is that the increase comes about in a way that gives rise to relative holdings among
people. The other is that trade occurs in small groups so that people cannot immediately see
the relevant aggregates.
In order to do that we embedded random aggregate and individual monetary transfers in a
simple and well-known model, the LW model, in a way that we hoped would not prejudice the
results. Part of our attempt to be non-prejudicial is our assumption that both buyers and sellers
receive transfers. Our results suggest that the Hume claim is delicate in two respects. First,
the wealth effect of the shocks on buyers has to be strong enough to offset the informational
updating implied by the two shocks that the buyer and seller see in a meeting. We provided a
sufficient condition for that to be true—near-degeneracy of aggregate shocks—and also suggested
that near-degeneracy is far from being necessary. The other respect is the potential role of wealth
effects on sellers. We could not study it because we used a model, the LW model, that precludes
wealth effects for sellers. Hence, that remains to be explored.
Although Hume wrote in the first half of the 18th century, economists were not able until
recently to work with his ideas about the circumstances in which increases in the growth rate of
17
money stock would be accompanied by increases in real economic activity. One can only wonder
how different the history of macroeconomics would have been if those ideas could have been
analyzed much earlier.
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Completion of Proof of Proposition 1.
In order to complete the proof, we need to establish the two claims about G set out below. We
start by repeating the definition of G.
max
x≥0





where, by (5) and (6),
ỹij(x) =

y∗ if c(y∗) ≤ xτiEij(1/s)





c(y∗)/Eij(1/s) if c(y∗) ≤ xτiEij(1/s)
xτi if c(y∗) > xτiEij(1/s)
. (21)
Claim 1. G is differentiable with derivative denoted G′. Moreover, G′(0) > 0 and G′(x) < 0 for





Proof. For existence of G′, it suffices to show that u[ỹij(x)]− vd̃ij(x)Eij(1/s) is differentiable for




















Because both derivatives coincide at c(y∗) = xτiEij(1/s), G is differentiable. Also, by (23),
G′(0) > 0. And by (24), G′(x) < 0 for all x ≥ x̄. 
Claim 2. G′(x) is strictly decreasing on (0, x̄).
Proof. For any x ∈ (0, x̄), G′(x) is a sum of terms, some of which are given by (23) and others of
which are constant. Obviously, those given by (23) are strictly decreasing because ỹij(x) < y∗.
Hence, the result follows.
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Proof of Example 1.




Since T = {1, τ}, we have µsn(1) = (τ − sn)/(τ − 1), and hence

































































which is increasing in sn if and only if sn ≥
√
τ .
Proof of Proposition 3.
To keep track of the transfers, we use τh to denote τ and τ` to denote 1. Because T = {τ` < τh},
we have
Eτh,τh(1/s) =
τ 2` Eπ(1/s)− 2τ` + Eπ(s)
τ 2` − 2τ`Eπ(s) + Eπ(s2)
, (25)
Eτh,τ`(1/s) = Eτ`,τh(1/s) =
(τh + τ`)− Eπ(s)− τhτ`Eπ(1/s)
(τh + τ`)Eπ(s)− Eπ(s2)− τhτ`
, (26)
Eτ`,τ`(1/s) =
τ 2hEπ(1/s)− 2τh + Eπ(s)
τ 2h − 2τhEπ(s) + Eπ(s2)
. (27)
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Because the buyer constraint is always binding and c(y) = y, we have




























Eπ(s) + τ`Eπ(1/s)− 2τ`
Eπ(s2)− 2τ`Eπ(s) + τ 2`
τh −
τ 2hEπ(1/s)− 2τh + Eπ(s)






[τh − Eπ(s)]2 [Eπ(s)− τ`]2 + Vπ(s) [Eπ(s)2 − τhτ`]{
[τh − Eπ(s)]2 + Vπ(s)
}{





τhτ` [Eπ(s)Eπ(1/s)− 1] [Eπ(s)2 − τhτ` + Vπ(s)]{
[τh − Eπ(s)]2 + Vπ(s)
}{
[Eπ(s)− τ`]2 + Vπ(s)
} ,
B =
Eπ(s) + τ`Eπ(1/s)− 2τ`
Eπ(s2)− 2τ`Eπ(s) + τ 2`
τh +
τ 2hEπ(1/s)− 2τh + Eπ(s)
τ 2h − 2τhEπ(s) + Eπ(s2)
τ`
− (τh + τ`)− Eπ(s)− τhτ`Eπ(1/s)
(τh + τ`)Eπ(s)− Eπ(s2)− τhτ`
(τh + τ`)
= − (τh − τ`)
2Vπ(s) {[τh − Eπ(s)] [Eπ(s)− τ`] [τh + τ` − Eπ(s)] + Vπ(s)Eπ(s)}
Eπ(s)
{
[τh − Eπ(s)]2 + Vπ(s)
}{
[Eπ(s)− τ`]2 + Vπ(s)
}
{[τh − Eπ(s)] [Eπ(s)− τ`]− Vπ(s)}
+
(τh − τ`)2τhτ` [Eπ(s)Eπ(1/s)− 1] {Eπ(s) [τh − Eπ(s)] [Eπ(s)− τ`] + Vπ(s) [τh + τ` − Eπ(s)]}
Eπ(s)
{
[τh − Eπ(s)]2 + Vπ(s)
}{
[Eπ(s)− τ`]2 + Vπ(s)
}
{[τh − Eπ(s)] [Eπ(s)− τ`]− Vπ(s)}
,





> 0 and B = 0,
and the function Y 1(s, π) is linear with a strictly positive slope. Now, since Eπ(s) = (1 + τ)/2,
we can further simplify the expressions. It is convenient to introduce
E = Eπ(s) = (1 + τ)/2 = (τh + τ`)/2, V = Vπ(s), b = [Eπ(s)Eπ(1/s)− 1] , e = (τh − τ`)/2.
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2 [V − b(E2 − e2)]
(e2 − V ) (V + e2)
.
The main difficulty is drawing conclusions about b = [Eπ(s)Eπ(1/s)− 1]. Now, with S =
{s1, ..., sN}, we consider the case where N is even (the other case is similar). Because π is
symmetric, for some ε1 > ... > εN/2 > 0, sn = E − εn and sN−n = E + εn with π(sN−n) = π(sn)















































B = − 4e
2










E (V + e2)
[
























Recall that we assume that s ∈ [α + (1 − α)τ, (1 − α) + ατ ], so that s ∈ [E − κe,E + κe],
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where κ = 2α− 1. Because A > 0 and B < 0, in order to conclude that
d
ds
Y 1(s, π) ∝ A+B
(
s− τh + τ`
2
)
= A+B (s− E) > 0,
it suffices to show that
A+Bκe > 0.






which in turn implies that
1 + τ > κ2 [(1 + τ) + 2(τ − 1)] , that is, E − κ2(E + 2e) > 0.
Because τ > 1, (29) implies that κ < 1, and the last ineqaulity then implies that































It then suffices to show that E [Eπ(e2 − ε2)] − 2κeε2 > 0 for all ε ≤ κe. Since the support of ε





− 2κe(κe)2 > 0, that is, e2
{
E − Eκ2 − 2κ3e
}
> 0,
which holds by (30).
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Proof of Example 2.
First we begin with the limit case where δ = 0. In this case, it is easy to verify the following.
Eττ (1/s) =
Eπ(s) + Eπ(1/s)− 2
Eπ(s2)− 2Eπ(s) + 1
,
Eτ1(1/s) = E1τ (1/s) =
(1 + τ)− Eπ(s)− τEπ(1/s)
(1 + τ)Eπ(s)− Eπ(s2)− τ
,
E11(1/s) =
τ 2Eπ(1/s)− 2τ + Eπ(s)
τ 2 − 2τEπ(s) + Eπ(s2)
.
Now, assuming that the buyer constraint is always binding, we have




(sn − 1)(τ − sn)
(τ − 1)2


















(τ − ε)(1 + ε)
.
Taking N → ∞, or, equivalently, ε → 0, we have
lim
ε→0










(τ 2 − 2(τ − 1)ε+ 2ε2 + 1)− 21
2









(1 + τ)− 1
2






(1 + τ)− 1
2


















τ 2 − 2τ 1
2
(1 + τ) + 1
2


















s+ τ + sτ − s2
2τ
.
Therefore, Y (s, π) is increasing iff s ≤ 1+τ
2
. For ε sufficiently small, the Phillips curve increases
first (between s = 1 + ε and s = 1+τ
2
), and then decreases at the tail (between s = 1+τ
2
and
s = τ − ε). Since the function Y (s, π) is continuous in ε and in δ (note that π implicitly depends
on δ), the non-monotonicity holds for small ε and small δ as well. 
Extension of Proposition 3.
In Proposition 3 we assumed a two-point support for T . Here we generalize the result to a more
general support, with some additional assumptions on µs. Suppose that T = {τ−I < τ−(I−1) <
... < τI−1 < τI}, and that T is symmetric around the mid-point, M = (τI + τ−I)/2, in the sense
that









for some (p1, p2, ..., pI) that satisfies
0 < p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ... ≤ pI and
I∑
n=1
pi(τi −M) = 1/2. (33)
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These assumptions ensure that the two conditions, (1) and (2), about µs are satisfied. Moreover,

















(One example that satisfies (33) is pi = 1/[2I(τh −M)] for all i.)
Proposition 4. Suppose that T and µs satisfy (31)-(33), that c(y) = y, and that β is sufficiently
small so that the buyer constraint is always binding in equilibrium. For each π symmetric around









there is a bound p̄π,α > 1/[2I(τh −M)] such that if pI < p̄π,α then Y 1(s, π) is strictly increasing
in s.
Proof. Let T satisfy (31) be given and suppose that µs takes the form given by (32). We first
prove the result under pi = 1/[2I(τh − M)] for all i, and then use continuity to establish the
existence of the upper bound p̄π,α. Note that the continuity result in Proposition 1 can be easily
extended and Y 1, as a function of (p1, p1, ..., pI) and π, is continuous.
































τ 2` Eπ(1/s)− 2τ` + Eπ(s)

































(τh + τ`)− Eπ(s)− τhτ`Eπ(1/s)


































τ 2hEπ(1/s)− 2τh + Eπ(s)
τ 2h − 2τhEπ(s) + Eπ(s2)
.
Note that the expression for Eτi,τj(1/s) coincides with that for (25) for all i, j, and hence we may
denote it by Eτh,τh(1/s); similarly, we may use Eτh,τ`(1/s) given by (26)to denote Eτi,τ−j(1/s) for
all i, j and use Eτ`,τ`(1/s) given by (27) to denote Eτ−i,τ−j(1/s) for all i, j. Moreover, because
the buyer constraint is always binding and c(y) = y, we have





















































































(sn − τ`)(τh − sn)
(τh − τ`)2
Eτh,τ`(1/s)(τ` + τh).
Again, this expression coincides with (28), and note that (34) coincides with (18) by taking
τ = τh/τ`. Hence, we can use results in Proposition 3 and this implies that Y 1(sn, π) is strictly
increasing in sn. Finally, since the result holds for pI = 1/[2I(τh−M)], it holds for a neighborhood
around it as well.
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